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ABSTRACT: It is widely accepted that a notion of ‘focus’, more
or less as conceived of in Jackendoff (1972), must be incorpo-
rated into our theory of grammar, as a means of accounting for
certain observed correlations between prosodic facts and seman-
tic/pragmatic facts. In this paper, we put forth the somewhat rad-
ical idea that the time has come to give up this customary view,
and eliminate ‘focus’ from our theory of grammar. We argue that
such a move is both economical and fruitful.
Research over the years has revealed that the correlations be-
tween prosody, ‘focus’, and the alleged semantic/pragmatic ef-
fects of focus are much less clear and systematic than we may
have initially hoped. First we argue that this state of affairs de-
tracts significantly from the utility of our notion of ‘focus’, to the
point of calling into question the very motivation for including it
in the grammar. Then we look at some of the central data, and
show how they might be analyzed without recourse to a notion
of ‘focus’. We concentrate on (i) the effect of pitch accent place-
ment on discourse congruence, and (ii) the choice of ‘associate’
for the so-called ‘focus sensitive’ adverb only. We argue that our
focus-free approach to the data improves empirical coverage, and
begins to reveal patterns that have previously been obscured by
preconceptions about ‘focus’.
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1. ‘FOCUS’ AND ‘FOCUS EFFECTS’
Following Chomsky (2007) and Jackendoff (1972), generative linguists
have incorporated into theories of grammar a notion of ‘focus’: to be a
‘focus’ is a feature of syntactic constituents which gets interpreted both
phonologically and semantically/ pragmatically by rules of the gram-
mar. This notion of ‘focus’ is intended, of course, to serve as a means of
accounting for certain correlations that we observe between prosodic
facts on the one hand, and semantic/pragmatic facts on the other.
We think it is fair to say that when “Jackendoffian” ‘focus’ was
incorporated into the grammar, it was hoped, at least initially, that
there would be one uniform and well-defined notion of ‘focus’, with
some clear semantic/pragmatic criterion for identifying the focused
constituent, and highly systematic prosodic marking of the focused
constituent; and that this notion of ‘focus’ would be useful for stating
generalizations and making the right predictions regarding a variety
of phenomena which involve a correlation between prosodic facts and
semantic/pragmatic facts (those phenomena that we are accustomed
to call ‘focus effects’).
That is, we think that at least initially, a really appealing theory of
‘focus’ and ‘focus effects’ was envisaged, one which would supply an
affirmative answer to the following three questions.
• Is there a semantic/pragmatic ‘definition’ of ‘focus’?
That is, is there such a semantic/pragmatic criterion which (i)
given any utterance α and its context, would enable us to identify
the focus (or foci) of α; and (ii) would be independent of any
further semantic/pragmatic generalizations that we would like
to capture using the notion ‘focus’?
• Is there a prosodic ‘definition’ of ‘focus’?
That is, is there some highly systematic prosodic marking of ‘fo-
cus’? I.e., is there a prosodic criterion which, given any utterance
α (including its syntactic structure and prosody), would deter-
mine what the possible focal structures of α are?
• Can we have a prosodic ‘definition’ and a semantic/pragmatic
‘definition’ of focus which ‘define’ the same ‘focus’?
That is, if a certain semantic/pragmatic phenomenon involves a
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constituent which seems to be prosodically marked, and if we
want to hypothesize that that constituent is a ‘focus’, then will
our hypothesis be compatible with both the prosodic and the se-
mantic/pragmatic ‘definitions’ of focus?
Undoubtedly, no semantic/pragmatic criterion for identifying foci
could ever be fool-proof (sometimes we might not be able to tell whether
the conditions that it specifies hold or not). Also, it has been obvious
since very early on that it is not the case that prosody completely dis-
ambiguates focal structure. But if it could be possible to come up with
both a prosodic and a semantic/pragmatic ‘definition’ of focus which
together give us enough information about what the focus of each ut-
terance might be, then we might still have a contentful theory of ‘focus’
which could be checked against the facts.
At least when we restrict our attention to a limited set of data, it
might seem that an appealing theory of ‘focus’ can be achieved. Con-
sider examples (1) and (2).1
(1) A: Who did you introduce to Sue?
B: I only introduced Bill to Sue.
L∗ H∗L L%
(2) A: Who did you introduce to Sue?
# B: I only introduced Bill to Sue.
L∗ H∗ L L%
We observe the following facts:
prosody: In each of the B sentences, there are just
two words carrying a pitch accent: only,
and one of the names. The name carries
the nuclear accent.
discourse congruence: B is a felicitous response to A in (1), but
not in (2). The accented name in (1B) cor-
responds to the wh-word in (1A), whereas
the accented name in (2B) does not corre-
spond to the wh-word in (2A).
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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semantic effect: In example (1), the domain of quantifica-
tion of only is unambiguously fixed, so that
the only possible interpretation is ‘the only
individual I introduced to Sue was Bill’. We
are accustomed to refer to this interpreta-
tion by saying that only ‘associates with’
Bill. In this particular example, we have
just noted that only obligatorily associates
with Bill.
These examples are usually analyzed based on the assumption
that in the B sentence, the accented name is a ‘focus’—that is, the
NP Bill/Sue carries a syntactic feature F, the H∗ pitch accent is the
prosodic manifestation of this feature, and the F feature is seman-
tically/pragmatically interpreted. We may assume, following Rooth
(1985), that the F feature semantically induces a set of alternatives,
also called a ‘focus semantic value’. We may assume the focus semantic
value of example (3) is as in (4).
(3) I introduced [Bill]F to Sue.
(4) the set of propositions which say of some individual d that the
speaker introduced d to Sue—where d is an atomic individual
or a plural individual
e.g., something like this:
{I introduced Bill to Sue, I introduced Tom to Sue, I introduced
Jack to Sue, I introduced Bill and Tom to Sue, I introduced Bill
and Jack to Sue, I introduced Bill, Tom and Jack to Sue,. . . }
This is then used to explain the facts, as follows.
We want to predict that the focus in the answer must correspond to
the wh position in the question. Following Roberts (1996), and Beaver
& Clark (2008), this can be done by positing the following constraint.
(5) The Current Question Under Discussion Constraint on Fo-
cus:
A declarative utterance must contain some part whose focus
semantic value is identical to—or a superset of—(the ordinary
denotation of) the question currently under discussion in the
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discourse.
Regarding questions, it is usually assumed in the literature on fo-
cus, following Hamblin (1973), that the denotation of a question is a
set of propositions which contains all the possible (partial) answers to
the question, true and false ones alike. Let us assume that each possible
answer to question (1A) specifies either an atomic or a plural individ-
ual. This means that the denotation of (1A) is very much like the focus
semantic value of (3)—something like the set in (4) above. The only
difference is that while the focus semantic value of (3) involves every
individual d in the model, we assume that the denotation of question
(1A) may be more restricted, possibly involving just a set of individuals
that are relevant in the context.
There are a number of different focus-based approaches to ex-
changes like (1). Let us review the analysis of Beaver & Clark (2008),
which provides an elegant and natural account of the data regarding
(1) and (2). In example (1), we distinguish three elements: (i) ques-
tion (1A); (ii) statement (3), called the prejacent of only in (1B); (iii)
only. We assume, with Beaver and Clark, that when (1B) is uttered,
the current question under discussion in the discourse (CQ) is question
(1A). The prejacent provides a (possibly partial) answer to this ques-
tion: it contributes the claim that Bill was introduced to Sue. Beaver
and Clark propose that the function of only is twofold: (i) it comments
on an overly strong expectation regarding the answer to the CQ, and
(ii) it says that the strongest true answer to the CQ is the prejacent.
Thus, only in (1B) would be used in a context where a stronger answer
might have been expected, e.g., that more people were introduced to
Sue, adding to the claim made by the prejacent the further claim that
none other than Bill was introduced to Sue.
Now we predict the discourse congruence facts. The prejacent in
answer (1B) has a focus semantic value which is identical to (or, in
context, possibly a superset of) the denotation of question (1A)—both
are something like the set described in (4). This satisfies principle (5),
so we correctly predict that (1) is congruent. (2), on the other hand,
does not satisfy principle (5): the denotation of (2A) is again as in (4),
but there is no part of (2B) whose focus semantic value is a superset of
this denotation; the prejacent here is (6), and its focus semantic value
is something like (7), which is not at all like (4).
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(6) I introduced Bill to [Sue]F
(7) the set of propositions which say of some individual d that the
speaker introduced Bill to d
e.g.,
{I introduced Bill to Sue, I introduced Bill to Tom, I introduced
Bill to Tom and Sue,. . . }
Beaver and Clark’s analysis also correctly predicts the fact that only in
(1B) must associate with Bill. The function of only is to say something
about the answer to the CQ. It follows from the principle in (5) that
the (short) answer to the CQ which is provided by (1B) must be the
focus. Hence, only must say something about the focus. And here the
focus is Bill.
In sum, we have an elegant account of (1) and (2): we have a
semantic/pragmatic criterion to identify the focus (it is the short an-
swer to the current question under discussion), we have clear prosodic
marking of the focus (by the nuclear accent), and both support the idea
that what only associates with is the focus.
2. WITHOUT ‘FOCUS’
In this paper, we shall put forth the somewhat radical idea that it might
be both possible and desirable to eliminate ‘focus’ from our theory
of grammar. This is work in progress. For the time being, we can only
make a start, laying out our reasons for believing that the ‘no focus’
hypothesis deserves serious consideration (in the present section), and
sketching how we would go about accounting for the relevant facts
without a theoretical notion of ‘focus’ (in section 3 below).
To start with, let us point out that, in fact, it is quite possible to
explain the facts about our examples (1) and (2) without assuming a
theoretical notion of ‘focus’.
Concerning the obligatory association of only with Bill, note that
Beaver and Clark’s analysis of only does not make any reference what-
soever to a grammatical notion of ‘focus’, or to focus semantic values.
Their analysis does relate only to the CQ, which is taken to be question
(1A)—only compares alternative answers which are members of the
denotation of (1A). It seems to us that that is quite sufficient for pre-
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dicting that only must associate with Bill. Members of question (1A)
are all of the “form” ‘I introduced d to Sue’. The prejacent of only ex-
presses one of these members, viz., ‘I introduced Bill to Sue’. And the
function of only is to comment on the stronger members, saying that
while some of them might have been expected to be true, in fact, they
are all false. This yields the desired interpretation, the one we describe
as ‘association of only with Bill’. We need not assume that Bill carries
an F feature, or that the prejacent has a focus semantic value.
Next, let us consider the discourse congruence facts. It is fairly
widely accepted that at least one of the functions often fulfilled by the
presence vs. absence of a pitch accent on a word is to mark that word
as ‘new’ vs. ‘given’ (in some appropriate sense). In current literature,
it is usually assumed that the relevant notion of ‘givenness’ is the no-
tion which Prince (1981) calls givenk (‘shared knowledge’)—that is, a
notion akin to Kuno’s (1972) ‘anaphoric’, Clark and Haviland’s (1977)
‘given’, and (1982) ‘familiar’, where ‘given’ basically means ‘present in
prior discourse’. Let us assume for the moment that the sole function
of pitch accent placement in the B utterances of examples (1) and (2)
is to mark whether a word is ‘given’ in this sense or not. Now, it is
clear that in the context of the question in A, all the words in sentence
B except for the words only and Bill are ‘given’ in this sense. But that
means that the pitch accent placement in (1) is appropriate (the two
accented words are the only ones that are ‘new’), whereas the pitch
accent placement in (2) is not appropriate (the ‘given’ Sue is accented,
while the ‘new’ Bill is not). That in itself is enough to predict that (1)
is felicitous and (2) is not.2
Now, why do we think that it might be desirable to eliminate ‘focus’
from our theory of grammar? The short answer is this: we do not
think that the appealing sort of theory alluded to in section 1 can be
achieved; for that reason, we are skeptical about the descriptive and
explanatory utility of a theoretical notion of ‘focus’.
Let us take an example.
(8) A: What’s peculiar about Granny’s dog?
B: She only likes John.
H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
We observe the following facts:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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prosody: Single Intonation Phrase. Each word in B
except for the pronoun she carries a pitch
accent. John carries the nuclear accent.
discourse congruence: B is a felicitous response to A. The whole of
B corresponds to the wh-word in A.
semantic effect: The prominent reading is with only associ-
ated with John.
Suppose we want to explain why it is that only associates with John.
When we discussed example (1), we saw that on the analysis of Beaver
& Clark (2008), the lexical semantics of only determines that it must
associate with the answer to the CQ. And, since Beaver and Clark ex-
plicitly adopt the view that ‘focus’ is the answer to the CQ, they predict
that only must associate with the focus. In example (8), however, what
only associates with, John, is definitely not the answer to the question
being addressed. Intuitively, B is directly answering the explicit ques-
tion uttered by A, and it is the whole sentence that provides the answer
to that question. This is further corroborated by the fact that except for
the pronoun, every word in the sentence carries a pitch accent.
Given this, it is not clear that we can maintain Beaver and Clark’s
nice picture. For Beaver and Clark, ‘focus’ is characterized as the (short)
answer to the CQ, and only always associates with a focus. The only
way to retain both of these generalizations would be to claim that (8B)
does not directly answer (8A), but rather a question implicitly present
in between (8A) and (8B), namely, who does Granny’s dog like?. How-
ever, the question who does Granny’s dog like? is not intuitively salient
in the context, or even intuitively raised by speaker B; there doesn’t
seem to be any prosodic evidence that it is the CQ (note that likes is ac-
cented); and it is not part of an obvious strategy for figuring out what’s
peculiar about Granny’s dog. It rather seems that B simply stated the
most peculiar property of Granny’s dog that came to mind.
In (9) and (10) we give two more examples where the associate of
only is not the answer to the CQ.
(9) A: Larry danced with Mary.
H∗ H∗ H∗
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B: Yes. The problem is that only Larry danced with Mary.
H∗ L L%
The associate of only in (9) is of course Larry (which is its syntactic
argument). But Larry is not the answer to the CQ, is it? There is no
explicit question here. So what is the question being addressed by B?
We would say that intuitively, the question is what is the problem?, or
maybe what is the problem related to the fact that Larry danced with
Mary?, to which the answer is the entire embedded sentence. At any
rate, it does not seem like B is implicitly answering the question who
danced with Mary? (to which Larry would be the answer).
(10) A: Who only likes bittersweet?
B: Mary only likes bittersweet.
H∗ L L%
In (10), the prominent reading of both question and answer is with
only associated with bittersweet. But in (10B), bittersweet is clearly not
the answer to the CQ. Intuitively, B is directly answering the explicit
question uttered by A; the answer being Mary.
If Beaver and Clark’s nice picture cannot be retained, then one or
both of the generalizations they endorse must be given up. Thus, one
is forced to choose one of the following three options:
Option 1: Neither characterize ‘focus’ as the answer to the CQ
nor claim that only must associate with a focus—as in
Rooth 1992;
Option 2: Give up the characterization of focus as the answer
to the CQ, while insisting that the associate of only is
always a focus;
Option 3: Give up the generalization that only must associate
with the focus, while characterizing focus as the an-
swer to the CQ—as in Roberts (1996).
Inevitably, giving up one or both of the two generalizations in ques-
tion would detract from the appeal of one’s theory, and would there-
fore weaken one’s motivation for positing the notion ’focus’ in the first
place. Nonetheless, let us consider the above three options one by one.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Option 1: Rooth (1992) neither characterizes ‘focus’ as the answer
to the current question nor claims that only must associate with a focus.
His theory says that foci are subject to the principle in (11), called the
FIP.
(11) The Focus Interpretation Principle (Rooth 1992): A focused
constituent must be contained in a constituent α of which the
following holds: in the environment there is an (indepen-
dently) salient set Γ, s.t. (i) Γ ⊆ ¹αº f ; (ii) ¹αº ∈ Γ; and
(iii) Γ contains some member distinct from ¹αº.
The FIP tells us that each focus must be related to some set Γ of seman-
tic objects which is independently relevant and salient in the context
(the focus must induce a focus semantic value which is identical to, or
a superset of, the contextually given set Γ), and that within the set Γ, it
should be possible to draw a contrast or comparison between the actual
proposition that was uttered and alternatives (at least one alternative)
to it.
The set Γ can be anything that happens to be present in the context—
it can be a question under discussion, it can be the domain of quantifi-
cation of only, and various other things. The FIP just requires every
focus to be related in the specified way to some set Γ or another. But
that means that in the end, what the FIP does is specify what a focus
effect amounts to, and require that every focus be involved in some
focus effect or another (it can mark the answer to a question, associate
with only, mark a contrasted element, etc.).
Rooth (1992) does not assume or provide any semantic/pragmatic
criterion for identifying a focus, besides what the FIP requires (namely,
besides being involved in some focus effect). Therefore, we have
no way of checking against the facts, based solely on the seman-
tic/pragmatic properties of focus, either the generalization that foci
must satisfy the FIP or any other semantic/pragmatic generalization
about focus. For instance, we cannot use example (8) (or example (1),
for that matter) as support for the hypothesis that 1only must associate
with a focus, since we do not have any semantic/pragmatic criterion
that will allow us to identify John (or Bill) as a focus, beyond the very
fact that it is what only associates with.
It seems that what Rooth (1992) implicitly assumes is that ‘focus’
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is identified based on prosodic marking, and the task of semantics and
pragmatics is not to give an independent criterion for identifying it,
but merely to specify its role in ‘focus effects’. Returning to (8), for
instance: to the extent that one can assume that the prosody of (8)
unambiguously marks John as a focus, one can be satisfied that the
relation of the prosodically-marked focus of (8) to the domain of quan-
tification of only is accurately described by the FIP, and, if one wishes,
one can also use (8) to test the hypothesis that only must associate
with a focus.
We feel that the position of Rooth (1992) is in principle defendable.
Moreover, we endorse Rooth’s idea that what only associates with is a
matter of a contextually determined semantic parameter. Yet, we may
ask the following questions.
(i) Can ‘focus’ be independently indentified by prosody? We know,
after all, that the connection between focus and prosody is far
from straightforward (cf. e.g. Schmerling 1976, Serlkirk 1984,
1996, 2007, Kadmon 2001, 2011, Féry & Samek-Lodovici 2006,
Büring 2006, Rooth 2010).
(ii) If, like Rooth, we do not endorse any semantic/pragmatic gen-
eralizations about focus beyond the FIP, is it still necessary and
worth our while to retain the notion of ‘focus’ in our theory of
grammar?
Option 2: Another option to consider is giving up the characteriza-
tion of focus as the answer to the CQ, but at the same time insisting
that the associate of only is always a focus. If such a position were
tenable, then our motivation for retaining the notion of ‘focus’ in our
theory would seem stronger. And, indeed, many leading researchers,
while they would acknowledge that John in (8) is not the kind of focus
characterized as being the answer to the CQ (aka ‘rheme’ or ‘informa-
tional focus’), they would at the same time maintain that John is a
‘focus’, perhaps the kind of focus called ‘contrastive focus’ or Kontrast.
In the literature, we find a number of ways of understanding the notion
‘contrastive focus’.
Some researchers (Valduví & Vilkuna 1998, Serlkirk 2007) simply
use the term ‘contrastive focus’ or Kontrast to refer to the notion of
focus of Rooth (1992).3 But what is our evidence that John in (8) is a
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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focus in that sense? There is no semantic/pragmatic evidence, beyond
the very fact that it is what only associates with. Is there prosodic
evidence then? A leading line of research holds that there is systematic
prosodic marking of ‘contrastive focus’ in the sense of Rooth (1992),
governed by the principle in (12):
(12) Contrastive Focus Prominence Rule: Within the scope of
a focus-sensitive operator, the focus is the most prosodically
prominent.
(Truckenbrodt 1995, Rooth 1996, Serlkirk 2007)
Can it be claimed, then, that this principle—or some other prosodic
principle—unambiguously marks John in (8) as the ‘focus’ and hence
as the associate of only? We don’t know. However, examples such
as (13C) below make us skeptical. In (13C), the most prosodically
prominent word in the scope of only is dependants. This word could
perhaps be considered a ‘contrastive focus’, but it clearly is not the
associate of only. Only associates with three, which is not the most
prosodically prominent word in the scope of only, and which doesn’t
seem to have any special prosodic marking which could identify it as a
‘focus’.
(13) A: Why won’t Smith get the subsidy?
B: Because he has only three kids.
H∗ H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
C: No, it’s because he has only three DEPENDANTS.
H∗ H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
↑longer duration,
higher intensity
Suppose now that there is some prosodic marking that systematically
helps us identify the associate of only. In that case, what would we
gain by insisting that the associate is prosodically marked as a ‘focus’
or ‘contrastive focus’? The alternative is to assume that the prosody
simply helps us identify the associate of only (when it is not syntacti-
cally unambiguous). Which seems to us like it might be a good enough
option.
Other researchers use notions of ‘contrastive focus’ which are meant
to come closer to our intuitive understanding of what it is to explicitly
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make a contrast (Erteschik-Shir 1997, 2007, Féry & Samek-Lodovici
2006, Zimmermann 2008, Büring 2008). Such notions do not seem to
be useful in helping us to identify John in (8) as a focus. Intuitively,
John in (8) can easily associate with only without being contrasted
with someone else. Further, in (13), where dependants is explicitly
contrasted with kids, only associates with three, and not with the con-
trasted element.
Option 3: The last remaining option is to give up the generalization
that only must associate with the focus, while characterizing focus as
the answer to the CQ—as in Roberts 1996. Choosing this option would
mean losing the focus-based account of the obligatory association of
only with Bill in example (1), as well as leaving example (8) unex-
plained. To explain why only associates with John in (8), we would
obviously need an account that does not rely on ‘focus’. For (1), we
have already provided a focus-free account, above. So maybe we can
do without ‘focus’ in all cases?
3. WORKING WITH THE ‘NO FOCUS’ HYPOTHESIS
Obviously, it is a major research project to take every fact that has ever
been explained using the notion ‘focus’ and try to show that it can
also be explained without it. And yet we can, in the present paper, at
least give some idea of why we think that a lot of facts can indeed be
explained without ‘focus’. In this section, we present a sketch of how
we would go about accounting for some of the central data.
Our current working hypotheses may be summarized as in (14).
(14) Our current working hypotheses:
•A major role of pitch accent placement is to indicate
givenp vs. newp.
Following Kadmon 2011, we believe that the notion of
‘givenness’ relevant to pitch accent placement is not
‘givennessk ’ (‘present in prior discourse’), as usually as-




•So-called ‘conventional association with focus’ effects
are all cases of contextually-determined semantic pa-
rameters.
We have argued above, contra Beaver and Clark 2008,
that the ‘associate’ of only is not necessarily the answer
to the CQ. We will propose below that the ‘associate’ is an
argument required by the semantics of only, whose value
is not fixed by that semantics, but gets recovered based
on the syntactic scope of only and any available contex-
tual and prosodic clues. We hypothesize that a similar
account can be given to even, also, and other operators
that would be classed by Beaver and Clark as ‘conven-
tionally’ focus-sensitive.
We believe that in the long run, eliminating the notion ‘focus’ while
striving to delegate its descriptive and explanatory roles to hypothe-
ses such as the ones in (14) will yield a more elegant and coherent
theory of grammar, and also improve empirical coverage, by revealing
patterns that have previously been obscured by preconceptions about
‘focus’.
3.1. Discourse Congruence and Pitch accent Placement
One central thing that the notion of ‘focus’ was meant to help explain
is the relation between prosody and discourse congruence; in particu-
lar, the relation between pitch accent placement and discourse congru-
ence. We believe, however, that this relation can be explained without
recourse to ‘focus’.
3.1.1. Facts Explained Based on Givennessk
Consider the following example, adapted from Selkirk 1984. The dif-
ferent versions of (16) will make appropriate answers to (15) in differ-
ent contexts.
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(15) What did she do on Monday?
(16) a. She sent her sketches to the publisher.
H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
b. She sent her sketches to the publisher.
H∗ H∗ L L%
(16a) is a natural ‘out of the blue’ response to (15), while (16b) can
answer (15) only in the right context—if, say, Jane’s job is illustrating
books, and we’ve been talking about the sketches that she has recently
prepared. Clearly, the presence or absence of a pitch accent serves to
indicate the informational status of the different words. Note that the
notion of ‘focus’ can’t help us explain the facts here, since it is clear
that in both versions of (16), ‘the short answer to the CQ’ is the whole
VP. Completely independently of the ‘focus’ issue, then, we can make
the assumption in (17).
(17) A central function of pitch accent placement is to indicate
whether a word is ‘given’ or ‘new’ (in some suitable sense).
(Schmerling 1976, Ladd 1980, Serlkirk 1984;
widely accepted view; independent of the ‘focus’ issue)
As noted in section 2 above, it is usually assumed in current litera-
ture that the relevant notion of ‘givenness’ is the notion which Prince
(1981) calls givenk (or at least a notion of ‘givenness’ closely modeled
on givenk).
(18) ‘given’ basically means ‘present in prior discourse’
givenk (‘shared knowledge’) of Prince (1981)
(Kuno’s (1972) ‘anaphoric’, Clark and Haviland’s (1977) ‘given’,
Heim’s (1982) ‘familiar’)
As already evident in Schwarzschild (1999), a wide array of facts con-
cerning the relation between pitch accent placement and discourse con-
gruence can be explained based on givennessk, or some species of it,
without recourse to ‘focus’. That includes examples like (15)+(16)
above, as well as examples like the following.
(19) A: What did you do about Bill?
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Without ‘Focus’ 16
B: I invited Bill
H∗ LL%
(20) A: What did you do about Bill?
# B: I invited Bill
H∗ L L%
(21) A: What did you do about Bill?
# B: I invited Bill
H∗ H∗ L L%
Of course, (19)–(21) have often received accounts which rely on the
notion of ‘focus’. However, as already illustrated in section 2, facts
of this sort can be explained without recourse to ‘focus’, based on
givennessk . Suppose we assume 1–1 correspondence between accent
and ‘novelty’, as in (22).
(22) If a word is not accented, that means it is givenk
If a word is accented, that means it is newk.
(i.e., 1–1 correspondence between accent and ‘novelty’)
Clearly, in (19)–(21), Bill is givenk, and invited is not. Hence, (22)
means that only invited should be accented, correctly predicting the
facts.
3.1.2. Difficulties for Givennessk which Suggest that we Need ‘Focus’
After All?
There are also facts of discourse congruence which cannot be explained
by merely assuming that the presence vs. absence of a pitch accent
means ‘newk ’ vs. ‘givenk ’:
All-newk transitive VPs with the verb unaccented
It is usually assumed that in an all-new transitive VP, if the object is
accented, the transitive verb is allowed to not be accented, as in (23).
However, (23) is incompatible with assumption (22) above, since in-
vited is unaccented despite being newk . It would be difficult for a the-
ory of discourse congruence based on (ordinary) givennessk to account
for such facts.
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(23) A: What did you do?
B: I invited Bill
H∗ L L%
The standard account of these facts (see Serlkirk 1984, Rochemont
1986, Serlkirk 1996) employs the notion of ‘focus’, and a syntactic fea-
ture F which is associated with accented words and gets projected up-
wards. First, it is assumed that the principles of F-projection determine
that accenting the object alone is enough to license F-marking of the
VP. Secondly, it is assumed that since the VP may be F-marked, it may
be interpreted as a ‘focus’ (i.e., the short answer to the CQ and/or that
which generates a set of alternatives). Finally, it is assumed that if the
VP is the focus, that makes (23B) a congruent answer to (23A).
As a matter of fact, there is a givenk-based theory which does man-
age to account for the congruence of (23) without using a notion of
‘focus’—that of Schwarzschild (1999). Schwarzschild defines a sophis-
ticated notion called GIVENness, which it is fair, we think, to describe
as a species of givennessk. Schwarzschild’s theory does not assume a 1–
1 correspondence between accent and ‘novelty’, allowing a non-GIVEN
word to not be accented.
Another approach is that of Büring (2006), where the pattern ex-
emplified by (23) is not explained based on ‘givenness’, but is not ex-
plained using ‘focus’ either:
In a nutshell, if a larger constituent is to be made prominent, this
is generally not done by assigning maximal prominence to each
and every word (or syllable) within that constituent, but rather by
assigning a default pattern of relative prominence across that con-
stituent. And the default pattern for English (and other Germanic
languages including Dutch and German) happens to be such that
predicates don’t receive a pitch accent if their argument(s) do.
(Büring 2006)
All in all, we do not think that the pattern exemplified by (23)
forces us to adopt a notion of ‘focus’. We also have reasons to believe
that the acceptability of (23) does rely on some notion of givenness,
namely givennessp, which will be discussed below. Note, for the time
being, that, out of the blue, (24) is not good.
(24) A: Why are you so upset?
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# B: I’ve beheaded Bill.
H∗ L L%
A word expressing the short answer to the CQ must carry a pitch
accent, even if it is givenk.
Consider the simple fact that a word expressing the short answer to
the CQ must carry a pitch accent, even if it is givenk .
4 For instance,
consider examples (25)–(26), adapted from Schwarzschild (1999).
(25) A: Who borrowed the book that Max had purchased?
B: I’ll answer your question: Max borrowed it.
H∗ L L%
(26) A: Who borrowed the book that Max had purchased?
# B: I’ll answer your question: Max borrowed it.
H∗ L L%
As noted by Schwarzschild himself, his 1999 theory cannot account for
these facts (both Max and borrowed are givenk and GIVEN). It might be
argued that to account for such facts, some principle of the grammar is
needed which determines that the ‘focus’ (in the sense of ‘the answer
to the CQ’) must carry (or contain) a pitch accent. We will argue that it
is possible to do without such a principle, if we make use of the other
notion of ‘givenness’ to be discussed below, viz., givennessp.
3.1.3. Difficulties for Givennessk which Suggest that we Need Givennessp
Consider the following example (from Kadmon 2011). In the context
of (27), (28a) is felicitous. Anna is accented, despite the fact that it is
givenk. In fact, Anna must be accented in this context—again despite
being givenk: without further context, (28b) is not a felicitous response
to (27). A givenk-based theory
5 would predict exactly the opposite
judgments.
(27) John and Anna walked in.
And then what happened?
(28) a. Anna yawned (27)+(28a) GOOD
H∗ H∗ L L%
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b. Anna yawned. (27)+(28b)
H∗ L L% BAD without further context
Next, let us look at words that are unaccented despite being newk.
Consider the following examples (also from Kadmon 2011).
(29) Context: B is the host of a variety show on TV, which doesn’t spe-
cialize in anything in particular. It has interviews, performances,
etc.
A: What’s happening on your show tonight?
B-1: Pavarotti is singing.
H∗ L L%
# B-2: Pavarotti is singing.
H∗ H∗ L L%
# B-3: Obama is singing.
H∗ L L%
B-4: Obama is singing.
H∗ H∗ L L%
Whether singing should be accented or not depends on the subject
NP: following Pavarotti, it is very unnatural to accent singing (as in
B-2), and the natural pronunciation is as in (B-1), with singing unac-
cented; following Obama, the reverse is the case—(B-3) with singing
unaccented is strange, and (B-4), with singing accented is natural. A
givenk-based theory would have no means of accounting for these data.
3.1.4. Givennessp
Kadmon (2011) suggests that the above examples can be explained
by using a different notion of ‘givenness’, the one Prince (1981) calls
givenp, which may be described as in (30).
(30) ‘given’ basically means: ‘its figuring in a certain role/ po-
sition in the utterance is inferable/expected/natural given
prior context’
givenp of Prince (1981)
(Kuno’s (1972) ‘predictable’, Halliday’s (1967) ‘recoverable’)
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Kadmon (2011) assumes 1–1 correspondence between accent and ‘nov-
elty’, as in (31).
(31) If a word is not accented, that means it is givenp
If a word is accented, that means it is newp.
(i.e., 1–1 correspondence between accent and ‘novelty’)
We should like to stress two things, however:
(i) Givenp, as we understand it, is a vague notion (when does some-
thing count as inferable or expected?);
(ii) By choosing not to accent a word, a speaker presents that word
as givenp; the hearers will accept this or not, depending on
whether treating that word as inferable or expected does not
seem to them to be too far fetched.
With givennessp we can account for the data as follows.
The given/newp approach immediately predicts the fact that, as
a rule, words which are part of the question being addressed by the
current utterance do not carry pitch accents.6 For instance, if you have
asked me who ate the beans, then, when I answer Fred ate the beans,
ate the beans is obviously as givenp as it gets—even if I just answer with
the single word Fred, you cannot fail to figure out that I meant ‘Fred
ate the beans’. Note that this is a focus-free account—it does not rely
on the assumption that the expressions which are part of the CQ are
‘outside the focus’.
Further, note that a word which constitutes the short answer to the
CQ is invariably (presented as) newp, since we ask a question precisely
because we don’t know what the answer is. That correctly predicts the
fact that a word which constitutes the short answer to the CQ must be
accented, even if it is givenk. (Recall example (25): Max is accented
despite being givenk because it is the answer to the CQ.) Hence, we
are not forced to say that carrying a pitch accent sometimes signifies
being newk and other times signifies being a ‘focus’. Instead, if all goes
well, we would have a unified analysis of what carrying a pitch accent
means—it means newp.
Now consider example (27)+(28). Anna is givenk, since it is present
in prior discourse. However, it is not givenp, in the sense that it is not
inferable or expected or particularly natural that the subject NP of the
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response in (28) should be Anna; it could just as well be John, or they
(i.e., John and Anna). Hence, it must be accented.7
Next, let us look at example (29). If the subject NP of the response
is Pavarotti, then singing is givenp: assuming that on the relevant show,
a guest usually does what they are good at or known for, and given the
world knowledge that Pavarotti is a famous singer, it is rather pre-
dictable that the action to be described should be ‘singing’. Hence,
in that case, singing should not be accented. We see then that to de-
termine accent placement, we don’t need to know here if singing is a
familiar or known thing (givenk); rather, we need to know if singing is
likely to be the action that the subject of the sentence will perform on
the show. If the subject NP is Obama, singing is not givenp, and hence
must be accented.
Finally, we turn to examples (23) and (24). Contra what is as-
sumed in the literature, we believe, following Kadmon (2011), that in
an all-newk transitive VP, the verb does have to be accented, unless it is
givenp. We believe, in particular, that example (23) is not really good
totally out of the blue. It is good in a context where we are planning
a party, and therefore talking about inviting people is highly expected.
This sort of context is not so hard to accommodate, and for that reason
the example may seem good when presented out of the blue. Craige
Roberts (p.c.) also notes the following: of the two internal arguments
of invite—the invitee and the event to which they are invited—the sec-
ond one is omitted, which strongly suggests to the hearer that (23B)
presupposes some context rich enough to supply it. This strengthens
our tendency to automatically assume that inviting is salient in the
context. Note also that ‘what did you do?’ is a question which is often
asked with regards to some task or problem—what did you do about
something; hence, it encourages accommodating additional context,
such as the party-planning context. Further, note that (32) is less ac-
ceptable than (23), because the less specific question does not imme-
diately hint at further context—at least not the party-planning context.
(32) A: What happened?




In contexts where it is not at all natural or expected that the answer
should involve inviting someone, (23B) is not a good response to (23A),
and (32B) is not a good response to (32A). Surely, replying with (33)
would be a much more natural response in such a context.
(33) I invited Bill
H∗ H∗ L L%
Now compare (23) with (24), which is definitely infelicitous—people
judge that in (24) the verb beheaded does have to carry a pitch accent.
This is not hard to explain, since a context where speaker B is expected
to behead people does not easily come to mind.
3.1.5. Accent Placement, Contrasts and Patterns
As is well known, there is a strong intuition that in some cases the
placement of pitch accents specifically serves to attract attention to
a contrast or comparison that is being drawn. For instance, in the
following examples.
(34) A: John drove Mary’s red convertible. What did he drive
before that?
B: He drove her blue convertible.
H∗ L L%
(Schwarzschild 1999)
(35) On my way back on the train, I was too tired to read, and just
half listened to what was going on around me.
In the restaurant car, an American farmer happened to
L∗ L∗ L H% H∗
meet a Canadian farmer.
H∗ L H% H∗ L L%
(a variation on the classical example from Rooth 1992)
Examples of this sort give rise to the following question: must we rec-
ognize that certain patterns of pitch accent placement directly convey
that a contrast is being drawn (independently of the role of pitch accent
placement as conveying givennessp vs. newnessp)? In this section, we
will argue that the speakers’ intuitions about contrast do not force us
to the conclusion that some notion of ‘contrast’ is conventionally asso-
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ciated with certain prosodic patterns. We will analyze these examples
using the notion of givennessp and a number of pragmatic strategies
involved in how the speaker manipulates what she chooses to present
as givenp, and how the hearer figures out what the speaker’s intentions
are.
On the face of it, examples such as (34) and (35) seem like coun-
terexamples to the givennessp approach. In (34B), it seems that the
word convertible is entirely newp (right after we’ve heard A, we don’t
know what type of vehicle John drove previously), and yet it is unac-
cented. Similarly for the second occurrence of farmer in (35). Worse
yet, note that response (36B) to the same question as in (34) is in-
felicitous. But the givennessp theory would predict that it should be
felicitous, wouldn’t it? Similarly for (37).
(36) A: John drove Mary’s red convertible. What did he drive
before that?
B: # He drove her blue convertible.
H∗ H∗ L L%
(37) On my way back on the train, I was too tired to read, and just
half listened to what was going on around me.
In the restaurant car,
# an American farmer happened to meet a Canadian farmer.
L∗ L∗ L H% H∗ H∗ L H% H∗ H∗ L L%
We think, nevertheless, that examples (34)–(37) are in fact compatible
with the givennessp approach. We would like to suggest the following.
The speaker of (34B) is attuned to the fact that both of the cars that
John used to drive are convertibles, differing only in their color. She
deliberately presents the word convertible as givenp, in order to draw
the hearer’s attention to what the two cars have in common, and to
the contrast in their colors. It works as follows. A cooperative, accom-
modating hearer faced with (34B) is forced to think of a way in which
the unaccented convertible could count as givenp. Noting what blue
convertible and red convertible have in common, the hearer concludes
that there is a continuation of a pattern in which John drives differ-
ent convertibles, and is satisfied with the idea that if one keeps talking




But what is wrong with (36B), then? Why can’t the speaker of B
choose not to act like she is continuing a pattern, and just treat both
color and type of vehicle as newp, in accordance with the fact that
they are both equally new to the hearer? We would suggest that that
is because of parallelism. The two assertions in A and B have exactly
the same syntactic structure and word order, and their meanings are
identical in everything except for the color. But that so strongly sug-
gests a continuation of a pattern in which everything is kept constant
apart from the color, that it becomes very unnatural to treat the word
convertible, occurring a second time, and in the same position in the
sentence, as newp. (A similar story goes for (37).)
Support for the account we have just suggested comes from the fact
that when parallelism is broken, accenting convertible becomes OK. In
both (38) and (39) below, all intonation patterns indicated are felici-
tous. It is quite natural in these examples to accent convertible.
(38) A: John drove Mary’s red convertible. What did he drive
before that?
B-1: He drove the convertible she bought for him.
L∗ H∗ L L%
H∗ H∗ L L%
B-2: He drove the convertible she bought for him.
H∗ L L%
(39) A: In 1994, John drove Mary’s red convertible. In 1995, he
drove her blue Jeep. And what did he drive in 1996?
B-1: In ‘96,
he drove her blue convertible.
H∗ H∗ L L%
L∗ H∗ L L%
B-2: In ‘96,
he drove her blue convertible.
H∗ L L%
B-3: In ‘96,
he drove her blue convertible.
H∗ L L%
In (38), parallelism is broken by altering the syntactic structure and
word order - the modifier now occurs in the form of a relative clause,
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which follows rather than precedes the word convertible. In (39), par-
allelism is broken by adding enough context to ensure that (i) the as-
sertion in B doesn’t immediately follow the assertion differing only in
the color, (ii) the pattern in which we keep talking about convertibles is
no longer the only salient possible pattern to continue, since we might
instead be talking about blue-colored vehicles.
We can make the correct predictions regarding (38) based on
givennessp. The speaker of (38B-1) does not expect the hearer to ex-
pect any connection between the two cars John used to drive, and
places her pitch accents accordingly: the car John drove previously
could be any car, so neither noun nor modifier are givenp, hence they
are both accented. The speaker of (38B-2) is attuned to the fact that
the cars are both convertibles, differing only in the additional attribute
given, and is drawing the hearer’s attention to this connection, and to
the contrast between their additional attributes, in the same way that
that is done in (34). (Note, incidentally, that a simple givenk-based
theory, using (22), would incorrectly predict that in (38) it should be
obligatory not to accent the word convertible.8)
In the case of (39) too, givennessp allows us to make the correct
predictions. The speaker of (39B-1) does not expect the hearer to ex-
pect any connection between the cars John drove before and the one
he drove in ‘96, and places her pitch accents accordingly: the ‘96 car
could be any car, so neither adjective nor noun are givenp, so they are
both accented. The speaker of (39B-2) or (39B-3) is attuned to the con-
nection between the ‘96 car and one of the previous cars. The speaker
of (39B-2) is thinking of the fact that the ‘96 and ‘94 cars are both
convertibles, differing only in their color, and is drawing the hearer’s
attention to this connection, and to the contrast in their color, exactly
as in (34). The speaker of (39B-3) is thinking of the fact that the ‘96
and ‘95 cars are both blue, and is drawing the hearer’s attention to that
connection, and to the contrast in the type of car. In both cases, the
hearer is able to recover the pattern that the speaker has in mind by
searching the context. (Note that a simple givenk-based theory, using
(22), would incorrectly predict that both blue and convertible should be
unaccented.9)
We think that the above discussion sheds some interesting light on
how we manipulate pitch accent placement when we want to draw a
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contrast. What such examples seem to show is that, at least in this case,
the notion of givennessp allows us to give some explication of the in-
tuition that a contrast is being drawn, without having to maintain that
the pitch accent itself directly marks contrast (or ‘contrastive focus’),
and without using a theoretical notion corresponding to contrast.
But now consider example (40), from Wagner (2006) (the tune of
B-3 was added by us).
(40) A: Mary’s uncle, who produces high-end convertibles, is
coming to her wedding. I wonder what he brought as a present.
B-1: He brought a CHEAP convertible.
B-2: #He brought a RED convertible.
B-3: He brought a red CONVERTIBLE.
H∗ H∗ LL%
On the face of it, it seems that givennessp cannot help us explain the
difference between B-1 and B-2, since cheap and red are both newp.
Wagner notes that, intuitively, the difference is that it makes sense to
contrast cheap convertibles with high-end convertibles, while it doesn’t
make sense to contrast red convertibles with high-end convertibles.
He says that that means that the account has to make reference to
appropriate alternatives of the form ‘x convertible’. In terms of ‘focus’,
that would mean making reference to (relevant members of) the focus
semantic value of CHEAP convertible or RED convertible. Do we have to
say then that the pitch accent on the adjective marks it as the ‘focus’,
or ‘contrastive focus’, of its NP?10 We don’t think so.
Here is what we think is going on. In (40B-1) and (40B-2), the
absence of pitch accent on convertible signifies that the speaker is pre-
senting it as givenp. The hearer of the response (i.e., speaker A) must
figure out (i) how convertible could count as givenp, and (ii) what B’s
goal might be in presenting it as givenp.
For (40B-1), it is quite easy for the hearer (i.e., A) to answer these
questions. Via (40B-1), A is being informed that the present Mary’s
uncle brought was a convertible; A also notices that convertible is be-
ing marked as givenp; and A knows that the uncle produces high-end
convertibles, and that at this point B knows that too. This strongly
suggests the expectation in (41).
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(41) The wedding present that Mary’s uncle brought for her is a
high-end convertible produced in his factory.
Therefore, A concludes that B is behaving as if (41) is what one would
naturally expect. In other words, B has succeeded in creating the con-
versational implicature that it is presupposed that (41) is what one
would naturally expect. But why would B want to implicate that? Why
doesn’t B just answer the question, accenting both cheap and convert-
ible, given that in fact A didn’t know what the present was? The answer
that suggests itself is that B wants to convey the message that there is
a gap between reality and expectations, perhaps because B wants to
convey the message that the uncle is stingy.
As for (40B-2), if the present was a red convertible, that is not
incompatible with the expectation in (41). Hence, (40B-2) can’t be
used to point to a gap between reality and expectations. But that means
that B has no reason to present convertible as givenp: if B is not going to
say anything about the connection between the wedding present and
the expectation in (41), there is no reason to hint at this expectation in
the first place. It is much more natural to present convertible as newp,
as in (40B-3).
Note that, contrary to what is implied by Wagner, the accented ad-
jective modifying the unaccented convertible does not have to contrast
with ‘high end’. For instance, (42B-1) is perfectly felicitous. It is clear
to us that the answer to the question posed by A is once again presented
as incompatible with the expectation in (41); this time, the given an-
swer, IMPORTED convertible, is incompatible with the expectation that
the convertible given to Mary should come from the uncle’s own fac-
tory. The speaker’s intention in pointing to this gap between reality
and expectations might be to hint that the uncle is eccentric, or to hint
that there might be problems with his factory, or whatever.
(42) A: Mary’s uncle, who produces high-end convertibles, is com-
ing to her wedding. I wonder what he brought as a present.
B-1: He brought an IMPORTED convertible.
Now consider the data in (43). Our judgment is that (43B-2) is a
felicitous response, just like (40B-1), whereas (43B-1) is very strange,
despite the recent mention of luxury convertibles.
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(43) A: Mary’s uncle, the one who produces expensive bicycles, is
currently stuck in Margaret’s luxury convertible on Route 97,
so he’s going to be late for the wedding. Guess what he’s
giving her as a present.
B-1: #I know what he’s giving her. He’s giving her a CHEAP
convertible!
B-2: I know what he’s giving her. He’s giving her a USED
bicycle!
This supports the account we have given above. It would be very far-
fetched to interpret A’s utterance as suggesting the expectation that the
uncle would give Mary a luxury convertible; hence, it is not natural
to present convertible as givenp. On the other hand, it is quite natural
to interpret A’s utterance as suggesting the expectation that the uncle
would give Mary an expensive bicycle; hence, it is quite natural to
present bicycle as givenp.
Note also example (44)—it shows that the unaccented noun does
not have to be mentioned in prior context.
(44) a. You have your own vineyard.
Why are you using bought grapes?
H∗ L L%
b. You have your own vineyard.
# Why are you using green grapes?
H∗ L L%
Finally, what about Rooth’s (1992) original example with the American
farmer and Canadian farmer? In that example, to be thought of as the
beginning of a joke, both occurrences of farmer are unaccented. The
tune might be as indicated in (45).
(45) An American farmer was talking to a Canadian farmer.
H∗ L H% L∗ H∗ L L%
The FIP of Rooth (1992) accounts for this example, if we assume that
(i) in each NP, the adjective is the focus of that NP, and (ii) the focus
of each NP is licensed based on the other NP. But the givenp approach
faces a difficulty: how is it that the first occurrence of farmer is allowed
to be unaccented? It may be part of a pattern, but it certainly isn’t the
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continuation of a pattern. . . so how could it count as givenp?
We think it is not a coincidence that Rooth says that his example is
to be thought of as the beginning of a joke. Compare with (46).
(46) The American president is meeting with the French president.
H∗ L H% H∗ H∗ L L%
(46) is not something that we would hear on a news broadcast. In
such a setting, not accenting the first occurrence of president sounds
very odd. It seems clear that there are essential differences between
the styles of ordinary conversation and reading the news (etc.) and
the styles of telling a joke, or an anecdote, or a story. So we do not
think that (45) is a relevant piece of data when studying the role of
accent placement in ordinary conversation. It may be that there are
specialized prosodic formulas used in story-telling.
3.1.6. Two Other Cases that May Seem Problematic for the Givennessp
View
Consider the following example.
(47) If you can’t read this, maybe you should put on your glasses.
L∗ L∗ H∗ L L%
(anonymous referee)
In example (47), why should there be a pitch accent on glasses? One
would think that given the rest of the example, glasses should be highly
predictable. And indeed it is, to us the readers. And yet, we think that
it makes sense for the speaker to present glasses as not predictable,
because presumably she is addressing someone who is aware they can’t
read this, and doesn’t seem to have thought of using their glasses, so
that her main point is to remind the addressee of their glasses.
Next, consider example (48).
(48) A: What’s the matter?
B: My Geranium plant is almost dead!
H∗ L L% (Bolinger 1972)
In (48), is almost dead does not seem to be really expected or pre-
dictable, and that is a problem for givennessp. (Likewise, it is a prob-
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lem for givennessk .) For clarity, let us characterize this sort of example
as follows.
(49) an all-new sentence—all of whose parts are both newk and
newp—which contains just one pitch accent (possibly with a
fairly long stretch of unaccented words)
It may be possible to explain (48) by saying that predicates (or
some predicates) are special in that they are allowed to be unaccented
even when ‘new’, as long as they are contained within a broad ‘focus’
which also contains one of their arguments, which is accented. This
may be done via F-projection rules, or in terms of a ‘default pattern’, as
in Büring (2006). We think, however, that this approach faces empir-
ical difficulties, and also misses a significant characteristic of this type
of example.
To see the empirical difficulties, look at (50)–(52). Here the words
which are ‘new’ but unaccented are not predicates, but arguments.
(50) Birds are singing again!
H∗ L L%
(51) The neighbors are quarreling again!
H∗ L L%
(52) The man on the left is drowning!
H∗ L L%
Let us offer the following observation. Examples like (48),(50)–
(52) seem to always express some special emotional message—horror,
surprise, frustration, urgency, delight, etc. Compare the two versions
of B in (53).
(53) A: Why are you buying new potted flowers?
B-1: My Geranium plant is almost dead.
H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
?? B-2: My Geranium plant is almost dead.
H∗ L L%
We think that B-1 is a natural matter-of-fact response, whereas B-2
sounds rather funny, because it suggests that the speaker is very much
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moved by the dying of her Geranium. Now compare this to our (48).
There the pitch-accent impoverished pattern sounds perfectly natural,
because the question what’s the matter? suggests that A noted that B
looked upset.
Next, we haven’t verified this experimentally yet, but our strong
impression is that the word carrying the lone pitch accent has extra
prosodic prominence, which is audibly stronger and more emphatic
than the prominence of an ordinary nuclear pitch accent. The ex-
tra prominence may involve intensity, duration, pitch range, choice of
pitch accent, and maybe more. Let us call it for the moment ‘emphatic
prominence’. The simplest hypothesis, it seems, is that there is a spe-
cial tune expressing emotion, which consists of ‘emphatic prominence’
on the item which is the central cause or focus of the emotion, and
complete absence of pitch accents in the rest of the sentence. In other
words, the examples under consideration involve a prosodic idiom
which expresses emotion.
3.1.7. Conclusion of Section 3.1
In this section (section 3.1), we have presented evidence leading to
the following conclusions. (A) A wide array of facts about the rela-
tion between pitch accent placement and discourse congruence can be
accounted for based on the role of pitch accents in marking words as
‘given’ vs. ‘new’, without recourse to a notion of ‘focus’—as is already
evident in some existing literature, in particular, in Schwarzschild
(1999). (B) The notion of givennessp (‘predictable’ or ‘recoverable’)
is considerably better suited to explicating the sort of ‘givenness’ rele-
vant to pitch accent placement than the notion of ‘givennessk ’ (‘present
in prior discourse’)—as proposed in Kadmon (2011). (C) Givennessp
is useful as a means of analyzing cases where, intuitively, a contrast is
being drawn, without relying on a theoretical notion either of ‘focus’ or
of ‘contrast’.
Our evidence was based on examples of the following sorts: (i)
examples which pose serious problems for the givennessk approach to
pitch accent placement and strongly suggest the givennessp approach—
such as the Anna yawned example and the Pavarotti is singing exam-
ple; (ii) examples which cannot be explained based on givennessk , and
which have previously been treated as involving ’focus’, but can be
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treated based on givennessp instead—such as the case of an all-new
transitive VP with the verb unaccented and the case of the short an-
swer to the CQ carrying a pitch accent despite being givenk; (iii) ex-
amples that intuitively draw a contrast, which can be analyzed without
using a theoretical notion of ‘contrast’, based on pragmatic strategies
involved in how the speaker manipulates what she chooses to present
as givenp, and how the hearer figures out what the speaker’s inten-
tions are—these include the examples where first John drove Mary’s
red convertible and then he drove her BLUE convertible, the examples
with the uncle who produces high-end convertibles who gave his niece
a CHEAP / #RED / IMPORTED convertible, and the example where a
vineyard-owner is using BOUGHT grapes.
3.2. Figuring Out What Only Associates With
3.2.1. The Analysis of Only
Our analysis of only is based on Sevi’s (2005) semantics for the exhaus-
tivity operator originally posited in Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984).
Any sentence can be factored out into two elements—a λ-abstract
and something that it can combine with by function application—in
any one of several different ways. For instance, (54) can be factored
out in any of the three ways given in (55). In each, one of the two
expressions can take the other as an argument, and once we perform
function-application, we get the logical translation of (54), viz., (56).
(54) Three boys came
(55) a. λn[∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=n ∧∗CAME(x)]] 3
b. λx[∗CAME(x)] λP[∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=3 ∧∗P(x)]
c. λP[∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=n ∧∗P(x)]] CAME
(56) ∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=3 ∧∗CAME(x)]
In the formulas above, x is a variable of type e, whose possible deno-
tations are atomic as well as plural individuals, and ∗CAME, ∗BOY, ∗P
are plural predicates, of type <e,t>, which can apply to atomic and to
plural individuals.
We would like to propose that the lexical semantics of only deter-
mines that it must be interpreted relative to a factoring out of the pre-
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jacent (i.e., the sentence minus only) into a λ-abstract, which we call
the skeleton abstract, and an element which can combine with it to
yield the prejacent, which we call the filled-in value.11 As will become
clear when we look at the examples below, the filled-in value is what
only associates with, and the skeleton abstract corresponds to the rest
of the prejacent. The skeleton abstract always denotes a (characteristic
function of) a set.
We take the truth conditional import of only to be identical to the
truth conditional import proposed by Sevi (2005) for the exhaustiv-
ity operator. The semantics of only makes reference to subsets of the
set denoted by the skeleton abstract, whose members are ordered and
form a join semi-lattice (i.e., subsets which are closed under an appro-
priate join operation). The semantics of only is as in (57).
(57) The truth conditional import of only:
Let T be a variable ranging over possible denotations of the
type of the filled-in value. Let P be a variable ranging over pos-
sible denotations δ of the type of the skeleton abstract, s.t. δ is
partially ordered by some ≤. Let Q be a variable ranging over
possible denotations d of the type of the skeleton abstract, s.t.
δ is partially ordered by some ≤, and furthermore, < δ,≤> is
a join semi-lattice. Let maxQ stand for the maximal member
of the semantic value of Q.
only = λTλP[APPLY(T,P) ∧∀Q[[Q⊆P ∧ APPLY(T,Q)]→
BE(T)(maxQ)]]
BE(T) stands for the ‘predicative interpretation’ of T, derived
by the BE operation of Partee (1987a) or some other suitable
operation. APPLY(α,β) stands for the result of either applying
α to β or applying β to α (whichever is possible).
Let us apply our analysis to derive the two readings of example (58).
(58) Only three boys came.
Case (i): only associates with three boys.
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The skeleton abstract: λ x[∗CAME(x)] = ∗CAME ‘came’
The filled-in value: λP[∃x[∗BOY(x) |x|=3 ∧ P(x)]] ‘three boys’
The predicative interpretation of the filled-in value:
λx[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=3] ‘are three boys’
only (three boys, came) = ∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=3 ∧∗CAME(x)] ∧∀Q[[Q⊆
∗CAME ∧∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=3 ∧Q(x)]]→ λx[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=3](maxQ)]
In words: At least 3 boys came and for every subset of atomic and/or
plural comers closed under sum formation which includes a sum of
boys with exactly 3 atoms, its biggest element is a sum of boys with
exactly 3 atoms. That is, exactly 3 boys came and no one else came.
Case (ii): only associates with three.
The skeleton abstract: λn∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=n ∧∗CAME(x)]
‘the set of natural numbers n s.t. at least n boys came’
The filled-in value: 3 ‘the number three’
The predicative interpretation of the filled-in value: λn[n=3] ‘is the
number 3’
only (three boys, came) = ∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=3 ∧∗CAME(x)] ∧∀Q[[Q⊆
λn∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=n ∧∗CAME(x)] ∧ Q(3)]→ λn[n=3](maxQ)]
In words: At least 3 boys came and for every finite subset of numbers
n s.t. at least n boys came which contains the number 3, its biggest
number is 3. That is, exactly 3 boys came.
3.2.2. Figuring Out What Only Associates With
When we are faced with example (58)—or any example with only—we
have to ask ourselves what only is supposed to associate with. In our
view, that means that we are looking for the factoring-out of three boys
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came into a skeleton abstract and a filled-in value which was intended
by the speaker. It is obvious to us that many different factors come to
our aid in our quest for the right factoring-out.
(58) Only three boys came.
factor 1
First of all, we assume the principle in (59), which immediately rules
out the association of only in (58) with the VP.
(59) The associate of only (=the intended filled-in value) must be
within the syntactic argument (i.e., within the C-command do-
main) of only.
factor 2
Secondly, if (58) occurs in a context which makes clear what the CQ
is, and if the prejacent answers that CQ, then that would immediately
suggest the factoring-out in which the skeleton abstract corresponds to
the CQ and the filled-in element is that short answer to the CQ which
is offered by the prejacent. For instance, in (60)+(58), question (60)
immediately suggests factoring out the prejacent (54) as in (61). (58)
will now mean that exactly three boys came and no one else did. In
such cases, only does indeed associate with the (short) answer to the
CQ, as per Beaver and Clark’s analysis.
(60) Who came?
(58) Only three boys came.
(54) Three boys came
(61) skeleton abstract: λx[∗CAME(x)]
= the abstract corresponding to the CQ in (60)
filled-in value: λP[∃x[∗BOY(x) ∧|x|=3 ∧∗P(x)]
= ‘3 boys’ = the short answer to the CQ in (60)
Note that when (60) is answered by uttering (54), we tend to in-
terpret (54) as ‘exactly three boys came and no one else did’ (which is
identical to the interpretation of (58) with only associated with three
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boys). This exemplifies a general tendency to understand answers as
exhaustive. Following Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984), we assume that
the grammar specifies an implicit semantic operation which turns an-
swers to questions into exhaustive answers (see also Sevi (2005), van
Rooij & Schulz (2006)). This operation has the same truth conditional
import as only, and it may get applied, optionally, to pairs consisting of
a question-abstract and a short answer to that question. But if so, we
would suggest that only in (60)+(58) may be regarded as an explicit
manifestation of the exhaustivity operator.
Regarding (60)+(58), we may note that the word only may either
carry a pitch accent or not. Why is that? Given the tendency to under-
stand answers as exhaustive, the option of not accenting only may be
explained by givennessp, since the presence of an exhaustivity opera-
tor is highly expected in many question-answering contexts. And what
about the option of accenting only? Well, the explicit use of only car-
ries a conventional implicature that ‘three boys’ is ‘not that many’ (cf.
Zeevat (2007) and Beaver & Clark (2008)). Note that this implicature
is stronger when only is accented. It seems then that when we ac-
cent only, what is newp is the content of the conventional implicature,
rather than the presence of an exhaustivity operation.
Due to the general tendency to understand answers as exhaustive,
when the prejacent of only is clearly answering a CQ given in the con-
text, the tendency of only to associate with the short answer to that CQ
is very strong indeed. And yet, it is not obligatory; when, for whatever
reason, the prejacent is clearly meant to supply a partial answer, only
associates with something else (—which is OK as long as the result is
still a partial answer to the question). For instance, in (62) and (63).
(62) A: Who came?
B: Only three boys, and maybe 5 or 6 girls.
(63) A: Who came?
B: All of the girls came, and only the boys who live nearby.
factor 3
We now turn to the role of world knowledge and general pragmatic
strategies in helping us identify the associate of only. Note, first, that
it is often possible to identify what only associates with relying purely
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on world knowledge.
(64) The following sentence, on a website entitled Funny Deaths, has
no relevant context that would make salient the question of what
the man ate.
There once was a man who only ate beans and cabbage.
(web example, as cited in Beaver & Clark (2008))
(65) She only wears green shirts. only associates with green
(66) She only dates tall blonds. only associates with tall blonds
But let us now turn to examples which possess both context and
prosody. Consider (10), a case often treated as involving a ‘second
occurrence focus’ (see, e.g., Partee 1991, 1987b, Krifka 1997, Rooth
1996, 2010, Büring 2006, Beaver et al. 2007, Howell 2007, Féry &
Shinichiro 2009).
(10) A: Who only likes bittersweet?
B: Mary only likes bittersweet.
H∗ L L%
Obviously, when (10B) is uttered, the CQ is the explicit question
in (10A), and the short answer to the CQ is Mary. But that of course
cannot be the associate of only (=the filled-in value that we’re looking
for), since it is not in its C-command domain. We must look for another
associate, then. Since only is part of the CQ, we expect that whatever
it associates with in the question, it will associate with in the answer.
Clearly, the most prominent reading, the one which immediately comes
to mind, is the one where only associates with bittersweet. And that is
simply because we very readily imagine a situation where A is handing
out chocolate, and wants to know who likes only bittersweet.
Now look at (8).
(8) A: What’s peculiar about Granny’s dog?
B: She only likes John.
H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
We assume that when (8B) is uttered, the CQ is the explicit ques-
tion in (8A). The short answer to the CQ is the whole sentence, in-
cluding only. But that of course can’t be the associate of only (=the
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filled-in value that we’re looking for). We must look for another asso-
ciate, then. Only could in principle associate with either John, or likes,
or likes John. But it is clear, we think, that general pragmatic consid-
erations lead us to choose the first option: regarding likes John, it is
hard to imagine that out of some contextually relevant ordered set of
properties that this dog might have, the maximal one she has is that of
liking John; regarding likes, without further context, it is not clear why
it would be relevant that the dog does not feel more ardently towards
John; regarding John, we can easily see that it would be highly rele-
vant information about the dog that of all individuals she knows, she
only likes John. Indeed, if we change the example a bit, we can easily
get association of only with the verb or the VP, lending further support
to the approach we’ve suggested for (8):
(67) A: What’s peculiar about Granny’s dog?
B: She only likes Granny.
H∗ H∗ L L%
Ambiguous:
can be continued with . . . She doesn’t love her (association with likes)
or with . . . She doesn’t like anybody else (association with Granny)
In (67), association with likes is a prominent reading. If it’s Granny’s
dog, then what she feels towards Granny is certainly relevant. We
think, however, that (67) is also OK on the only Granny reading. In
that case, the message conveyed is something like what’s expressed by
(68).
(68) Of course being Granny’s dog she only likes Granny.




In (68), only associates with Granny—that is, only associates with the
object NP, as in (8B), though this time the object is unaccented. (Note
that this example is a lot like the famous (69), where only also asso-
ciates with the unaccented object NP.)
(69) People who grow rice generally only eat rice.
L∗ H∗ L H% H∗ L L%
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(Rooth 1992, tune added by us)
(68) may be contrasted with (70), where only does not associate
with the object NP, but rather with the verb, likes.
(70) Despite being Granny’s dog she only likes Granny.
H∗ L∗ L+H∗ L H% H∗ L L%
high intensity
long duration
It can’t be that the contrast between (68) and (70) is due to the syntax
or prosody of the examples. Clearly, the contrast must be due to the
content of the left-hand clause combined with general world knowl-
edge.
In fact, we think that in principle the same prosody as in (8) allows
for different readings, with different associates for only—we just need
an example where pragmatic considerations make all these readings
plausible. For instance, it seems to us that (71B) can have any one of
the three interpretations specified:
(71) A: What can you tell me about Granny’s dog?
B: She only sniffs her food
H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
(i) only associated with her food (can be continued with
. . . I mean, she never sniffs anything else);
(ii) only associated with the VP (can be continued with
. . . I mean, she never does anything else)
(iii) only associated with sniffs (can be continued with
. . . I mean, she never touches it)
Similarly, we think that in (72), all three readings are possible. (If you
have difficulty getting the third one, look also at (73).)
(72) A: Why do you think she won’t make a good secretary?
B: She only typed that memo.
H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
If you know that I assigned her several different tasks, you get: only VP




If you know that I asked her to prepare and mail a memo, you get: only
typed
(73) By 4 p.m., she only typed that memo,
H∗ H∗ H∗ L H%
even though I specifically asked her to circulate it by noon.
factor 4
Of course, prosody too plays an important role in determining the asso-
ciate of only. For instance, take (71B) above. Here the transitive verb
and its object both carry pitch accents, and are within a single Intona-
tion Phrase. In such examples, there is a bias against association with
the verb. On the other hand, look at (74). Here we have retained the
accent placement, but introduced an Intonation Phrase boundary after
the verb. And that creates a strong bias in favor of association with the
verb.
(74) She only sniffs her food
H∗ H∗ L L% H∗ L L%
Let us make two general comments regarding the role of prosody
in determining the associate of only:
(i) We know that many aspects of prosody play their parts in dis-
ambiguating or biasing many aspects of semantic interpretation. For
instance, we can disambiguate the structural ambiguity in Successful
psychologists and models make a lot of money with the help of prosodic
phrasing—and note that here we use the same means of disambigua-
tion as in (74). It therefore seems to us completely unsurprising that
various prosodic factors similarly play their role with only. (ii) There
seem to be certain constraints on the choice of associate per given
prosodic pattern. For instance, not only do we have the bias against
association with the verb in examples like (71), but also, consider sim-
ilar examples where only C-commands an NP containing an adjective
and a noun:
(75) Only green witches eat children.
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H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
can be continued with
. . . not old ladies
or . . . not green ogres












only witches green eat children
can be continued with
. . . lo dodot zkenot
. . . not aunts old (. . . not old ladies)
or . . . lo sgulot
. . . not purple (pl., fem.) (. . . not purple ones)
but not with# . . . lo miflacot yerukot.
. . . not monsters green (. . . not green monsters)
As far as we can tell, with the prosody indicated, association with
the word immediately following only is not possible. Interestingly, it
doesn’t matter whether the noun comes first (as in Hebrew) or the ad-
jective (as in English). This looks like a rather arbitrary constraint,
especially if we compare with (77), where only can easily associate
with the numeral, which is the word immediately following it.
(77) Only three boys came to the party
H∗ H∗ H∗ H∗ H∗ L L%
Interaction of factors:
Example (78) is interesting. The short answer in (B-1) is interpreted as
conveying that what John ate only in Paris is crêpes. On the other hand,
it is completely impossible to interpret (B-2) in the same way, despite
the fact that that is the only interpretation which would answer the
question. Why is that?
(78) A: What did John only eat in Paris?
B-1: Crêpes.




(due to Roger Schwarzschild (p.c.), as cited in Büring 2008)
Büring (2008) offers an explanation based on prosodic constraints
on focus and the assumption that both crêpes and Paris are foci (one
is ‘the answer to the question’ and the other is the intended ‘second
occurrence focus’). Büring says that (78) is bad because there is a
focus—crêpes—intervening between only and its intended associate (in
Paris). He then compares (78) with (79). Büring suggests that the
contrast is due to the way different possibilities of prosodic phrasing
below the level of the intermediate phrase interact with the prosody of
focus—only accept can form a small prosodic phrase, whereas the more
structurally complex only ate crêpes cannot.
(79) A: I only have a credit card.
B: That’s quite all right,
we only accept credit cards.
H∗ L L%
(Büring 2008)
We would like to offer an alternative account, which is focus-free.
When we hear (78B-2), it is clear beyond any doubt that the short
answer to question (78A) must be crêpes, since (i) it is the only food-
stuff mentioned here, and (ii) it carries the only pitch accent, so it is
being presented as the only thing that’s newp (i.e., not expected or
predictable). Recall that we have a strong tendency to interpret only
as associating with the short answer to an explicit CQ. Apparently, this
tendency is so great, that it overrides both the fact that there is an only
associated with Paris already occurring in the CQ and the fact that if
only in (78B-2) associates with crêpes, then (78B-2) fails to answer the
CQ.
And what about (79)? Since our proposed account of (78) relies
on the explicit CQ, we must ask ourselves now what the CQ of we
only accept credit cards is. We think that the CQ is something like Why
is it all right that A only has a credit card?. Certainly, accept is not
the short answer to that question—rather, the short answer seems to
be the entire clause, including only. So the strong bias in favor of
associating only with the short answer to the CQ is not relevant to (79)
at all. We are not tempted to associate only with accept, and we rely
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instead on general world knowledge to tell us that credit cards is the
most plausible associate of only in this example.
Recall also that we have suggested that one thing which makes the
tendency to associate only with the short answer to the CQ so strong is
the more general strong tendency to interpret answers as exhaustive.
So let us eliminate this latter factor, by making it clear that the answer
is not intended to be exhaustive. Consider (80) and (81). We find
these examples quite acceptable, providing further evidence for our
proposed account of (78).
(80) A: What did John only eat in Paris?
B: I know for sure he only ate crêpes in Paris, and possibly also brie
L∗ L+H∗ L H% H∗ H∗ LL%
(81) A: What do you only eat on the spot?
B: I only eat corn on the cob on the spot.
L+H∗ L H%
Finally, consider (82). We think that (82) shows that Büring’s
prosody-based account is not general enough to cover all the facts.
(82) A: Where did John only eat crêpes?
B-1: In Paris.
B-2: # John only ate crêpes in Paris.
H∗ L L%
Here the accented Paris does not ‘intervene’ between only and its in-
tended associate crêpes, and as far as we understand it, Büring’s ac-
count would predict that (82B-2) should be a felicitous response, just
like (82B-1). However, our judgment is that it is not. We think that
(82B-2) is as bad as (78B-2) is. It is important of course to make sure
that one is judging (82B-2) pronounced as marked, i.e., as a single
Intonation Phrase; (83B), in contrast, seems quite all right.
(83) A: Where did John only eat crêpes?
B: John only ate crêpes in Paris.
H∗ L H% H∗ L L%
Of course the contrast between (82) and (83) shows that prosody
does play some role here. . . but we think the role it plays fits quite
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nicely with the account we suggested above. The prosody of (83B)
separates the part of B which corresponds to the CQ (83A), on the left,
from the part of B which provides the answer to it, on the right. This
underlines the fact that only is part of the CQ. Further, the prosody of
(83B) is taken to mark crêpes as a ‘contrastive topic’—that is, it im-
plies that the CQ (83A) is being selected out of a set of alternative
questions of the form Where did John only eat x? by assigning x the
value crêpes(cf. Kadmon (2011), ch.20).12 This enhances the salience
of the fact that only associates with crêpes in the CQ. As a result, the
prosody of (83B) tips the balance of conflicting factors the other way:
our general tendency to interpret only as associating with the short an-
swer to an explicit CQ (in (83B), that would be Paris) cannot in this
case override the facts that only is part of the CQ (and hence cannot be
an explicit realization of the default exhaustivity operation), that it is
already associated with crêpes in the CQ, and that if it were to associate
with Paris in (83B), this utterance would fail to answer the CQ.
3.2.3. Conclusion of Section 3.2
Much research is needed to better understand the nature of the di-
verse factors affecting the choice of associate for only (and other ‘focus-
sensitive’ adverbs) and the interaction between them. Yet our initial
results do already point to several conclusions: (A) The semantics of
only specifically refers to an associate (i.e., filled-in value). It is to that
extent that the relation between only and its associate is indeed con-
ventional (encoded in the grammar), as suggested in Beaver & Clark
(2008).
(B) Choice of associate, though constrained by the grammar (e.g.
by C-command), is by no means determined by it; Rooth’s (1985,
1992) idea that ‘association’ involves an implicit semantic parameter
whose value is determined contextually seems right, whereas Beaver
and Clark’s idea that the associate must be the answer to the CQ is def-
initely wrong. (C) There is no need to assume that ‘focus’ plays a role
in how the relevant semantic parameter (the filled-in value) is fixed.
(D) At least some of the prosodic factors which help fix the associate
are factors involved in prosodic disambiguation in general.
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APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPTION OF INTONATION CONTOURS
For the phonological representation of intonation, we assume the frame-
work of Pierrehumbert 1980, Beckman and Pierrehumbert 1986. Our
transcription of intonation is based on the related ToBI system (Beck-
man & Hirschberg 1994).
Intonation contours are analyzed into sequences of relatively high
and relatively low tones (written H and L). In English (and, it seems,
in Hebrew as well), we have the following kinds of tonal entities. One
kind of tonal entity, the ‘pitch accent’, is always aligned with a syllable
bearing a main word stress. There are also two kinds of tonal entities
which do not align with any particular syllable, but rather occur at
edges of prosodic phrases: ‘boundary tones’ at the end of an intonation
phrase, and ‘phrase accents’ at the end of a smaller phrase called the





A peak of high pitch on the first syllable, followed by a drop to the bottom of the
speaker’s range. Such intonation would typically be used when Anna is an (exhaustive)
answer to a question. e.g., in: A: Who are you going to marry? B: Anna.
Like the previous tune, except that the pitch rises again after the low phrase accent.
Such a tune would be used when Anna is an incomplete answer to a question, indicating
that the list may be continued. e.g., in: A: Who shall we invite? B: Anna,. . . C: Ginny,. . .
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Notes
1For the transcription of intonation contours, we use the ToBI system (Beckman and
Hirschberg 1994). For some details, see appendix.
2Indeed, that is what the theory of Schwarzschild (1999) predicts, based on GIVEN-
ness, which is Schwarzschild’s particular adaptation of givennessk , and without recourse
to ‘focus’.
3Valduví & Vilkuna (1998) do not actually say that their term Kontrast corresponds to
Rooth’s ‘focus’, but as far as we can tell that is in fact the case. Their Kontrast generates
a set of alternatives which are exactly like the members of a focus semantic value, but
restricted to those alternatives that are ‘comparable’, which (as far as we can tell) basi-
cally just means relevant in the context. This set therefore corresponds neatly to Rooth’s
set Γ: it is a subset of a focus semantic value, and possibly a proper subset of that focus
semantic value. Serlkirk (2007) is quite explicit about using ‘contrastive focus’ to refer
to the ‘focus’ of Rooth (1992).
4Or GIVEN, in the sense of Schwarzschild (1999).
5Including Schwarzschild’s (1999) GIVEN-based theory.
6An obvious exception is the pitch accents on a ‘contrastive topic’—but note that those
involve a specialized intonation pattern (they would occur in a separate prosodic phrase
ending in a continuation rise), and it is clear that their very purpose is to underline the
choice of CQ. Another exception is briefly discussed in Büring (2007)—he suggests that
there are ‘ornamental’ pitch accents which do occur on material which is ‘given’ and are
governed by general principles of rhythm and prosodic organization.
7To be precise, Anna in (28) must be accented in the absence of further context. We
think that (28-b) can felicitously follow (27) if it is clear in the context that attention is
centered around Anna, and it is therefore expected that the answer will concern her (in
which case Anna is givenp).
8That is also the prediction made by Schwarzschild (1999).
9Schwarzschild (1999) incorrectly predicts that either blue or convertible should be
accented, but not both (based on his constraints FOC and AvoidF).
10The ‘focus’ or ‘information focus’ of the whole sentence, assuming that there is one,
would presumably be the whole object NP.
11This may look a lot like ’structured meanings’ (the approach to focus developed in
von Stechow 1981, 1982, 1989 Cresswell & von Stechow 1982, Jacobs 1983, Krifka
1991, 1992), but it does not involve any grammatical marking of any constituent in the
sentence as a ‘focus’, and the pair of expressions into which the sentence is ‘factored out’
is not claimed to be a representation of the sentence at any level.
12In other words, it strongly suggests the factoring-out of question (83A) roughly as
indicated in (i).
(i) the abstract corresponding to (83A): λx[John only ate crêpes at location x]
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